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The philosophical app1•oaeh of Spren Kie,rkegae.l'd has 
fo~ many years bean recognized as one of the outstanding 
attempts within the Lu'thei"an Chm.~ch. to construct and formu-
late a Olu~istian. philosophy·. For this reason alon~~ there 
is aut'f':lcient merit in al.most any exruninatio:n of' his works. 
This ~tudy, howe,rer, }:'):!?oposes to examine not exclusively 
the wo:Pk of Kie~kegaru:d.11 bu-t also the baekgrouncl of radical 
.r•ationaliem against; wh:i.ch .he and hia the1at1e existontial 
vi ew was aet. 
It is obvious from even~ cursory reading of Kiero 
ke ge.~"ldV s works the.t his philosophic i'omulation was designed 
to count er-bru.ance the tremendous int'lue11ee of' Hegelian 
I d.1:ia.liam. on the thi;nki..l'lg of the Christi.an Church, and in 
pa.1,tiaular g the Lutheran Church ot Dem.a.ark during h:l.s 
11.fetimo. It is the1 .. ·0i"ore quite propel' that this study 
should be devoted to an exmnination of the doctrines ot 
both philoaophie ao.hoole in an atteD1pt to clarify the majoxa 
areas or conton~ion. 
We have not attempted within the brief cmnpass or this 
study to give a summary of the entire philosophical position 
of either Hegel or Kierkegaard. Rather• we have attempted 
to explicate several i"eatures of both views in an 011deavor 
to point up the immediate disagreement existing between the 
purely rationalistic and idealistic philosophy ot Hegel, and 
one which aspired to represent Biblical truth. 
111 
We have not exhausted the works of either philosopher 
by any means. Inasmuch as the major work ot Kierkegaard, 
Conolud1na Unso1ent1fio Postscrip~. was directed essentially 
at Hegelian philosophyq we have contined the evidence 
adduoad 11'1 w1t1o1sm ot: Idealism to that wol'k, although the 
quest for• a proper underst.anding must l .ead one to every 
other work of Kierkegaard. ThG source ot evidence tor the 
sigui£1cant features of' Hegel's view has been e. selection 
of Regel•s ·works in addition to aeeonde.ry sources on which 
we have found it necessary to ~ely heavily. 
The criticism to be 1'ound in the existential philosophy 
ot s. K. '1. e.s · h.e ia soraetimoa gratU'yingly called'1 of Hegelian 
rut1onalism has been considered by many to be one 01' three 
. l 
ir.lportant examinations of that systom. Though there are 
~ome, for example Ra.msey~2 who ha~e attempted to minimize 
t he divergence of the two schools of thougl1t» 1t is the 
bU1~den or this study tG illueidate those salient features 
of eaeh li'hich cannot be :reeonciled by eny similarity in 
te:Ail1no2ogy or style 0£ exposition. 
It must be remembered when the reader notes the apparent 
prox1roity of the two 0 that K1eFkegaard waa trained undeF 
the influence of the Hegelian system at the University or 
Copenhagen") and that it was an arduous task for the Dane 
lHugh Ross Mackintosh. Trnes .2£ Modern Theologz (England: 
Sor1bner•s, 1939), P• 226. 
2Paul Ramsey has done this in several articles prepared 
fol? philoaophica1 publications. 
3David F. Swenson, Something t~gS} Kierf!!aarg, (Minnea-
polis: Augsburg Publishing House, , P• • 
~Y . 
finally to break tree of the system in which he was so 
muei"l a:t home. His tor-sllino~ogy and much of his approach 
I 
still bear the starap or th~a early training. 
I Some mention must bo Iifde a~ one significant aspect 
I 
of th:ts study. We have endijavored to emphasize those charac-
; 
I • 
teristios of each ph1losop~ic view which aeem to prove an 
' 
existing opposition betwee~ the two. No attempt has been 
made furthe1• to develop thore views. Therefore. we have 
' been deliberate in the omission of an exposition or the 
l: 
Hegelian State or Society~ and the existential dialectic 
proQess of s. K. whiah was an antithetioal "aystemn. 
:·v 
CHAPTER I 
THE NATURE OF REALITY 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrieh Hegel was an absolute idealist 
1n the fullest aer'8e, and to understand such an absolute 
idealism is to understand Hegel. Absolute idealism enviaa 
ioned the universe primarily as an organically united and 
1.,ele..ted world of ldeasg the Idea itself, revealing itselt 
in ehanging manifestations of leaser ideas. This world• 
'l.Tiew.11 therei'ore, presents two separatet yet integral units 
of.' wh:1.oh careful explication is necessarye The first unit 
of this world-view ia the Hegelian concept of the Idea and 
its components. The second unit is the method by which 
this Idea or Reason is manifested. 
Hegel ia principally concerned with the nature and 
manifestations of ultimate Reality. The whole of Reality 
ho terms the Absolute, and speaks of this Absolute variously 
. . l 
as Reason. Ideag Spirit, and Mind. This Reality or Idea 
io composed of the world of ideas 1n an organic and inter-
related whole, oaoh or wh1oh 1a 1n 1taelt a part, an 
entity ot the ultimate Idea, yet a complete reflection 
of that Idea. "For the idealist, the whole world of ideas 
is essentially one world, one all inclusive experience or 
l1rw1.n Edman and Herbert w. Schneider (ed.), Landmarka 
fop Beginners ,.n Philoaoplg' (New York: Rem'J' Holt and do., 
!9Zµ.J, P• 648. -
l 
2 
an absolute mind. Each t1n1to thing is accordingly regarded 
as a tragment of the Absolute experience, and ea<n finite 
2 
mind as part of' the absolute mindo "· It is apparent then, 
that fini·te minds~ the minds or individuals. are canponenta 
ot the manifestations of Absolu·te Mind or Reality as well 
aa ldeas .. The multitude or ideas which comprise the ultimate 
Reality are the discoverie5 of individual mental inveat1ga-
·t;ion£> discoveries of tzi,uths which are in themselves realities. 
'They are realities, howover» wh1.eh no :roan has created, but 
merely discoveredo These ideas or truthB were valid long 
before any human mind discovered them.3 Individual ideas 
must not be confined solely to substantial facts in the 
sense that they have no quality 0£ matte~. Time and space 
are included among the ideas which <X>mprise Reality because 
finite minds reflect Reality. As the individual mirrors 
t he whole of Reality each moment of the individual•s exis-
tence n11rrors all time and eternity. Each moment has an 
eternity of experience embodied in it because each moment 
reflects eternity. Any part of apace and time baa• like 
finite mind, the essential qualities of all space and time. 
Thus, we may deduce fl-om theae premises of Hegel that 1n a 
sense the microcosm is a mirror of the macrocosm. 
Since the Idea ie so compoaed of :finite minds and 
ideas. we ean ascribe certain attributes to the Idea itself. 
2E. o. Bewkes et al., Ex!erienoe. Reason and Faiths 
A s~ez in Phfloao~ and Re le;lo~ (New York:Tarper and 
lJrdt!iers. ""i940, • P• ~. 
3w1111am Kelley Wright. A Hiator, of Modern Philoaophl 
(New York: The Macmill'11l co.,-:i.941). p.~7. 
.3 
Because f'1n1te ideas are eternally valid~ the Absolute which 
1s mirrored by those ideas is also timeless, a comprehena1ve 
eternal. ti-uth. Thia absolute Reality is tbs organic, 
unified worldo It is rational and knowable in its o~gan1c 
relations. It is what may be ·r1guratively called God. Above 
s..11# it is ooncrote, e.s distinguished from the Platonic 
Ideasj the very nature or wlu.ch was abstract. In Hegel's 
.for.ru.u.lat1onll eo,noreteness is a rnatter of degree. The more 
t he ideaa are related with other ideasg the more concrete 
they become$ until ult:bi1ate concreteness is reached in the 
world0 soul of the Absolute Reality.4 ·Thus also0 the 
experiences of finite m1nd0 aa they are multipliedg become 
mo~e oonacious of the nature of the whole structure of the 
Absolute Idea 01~ Reality and so more concrete.. In its least 
consci ous, least substantial ·toxrm., Hegel calls the finite 
mind subjective mind. Even subjective mind, however, haa 
content and fom, and is to some extent actual and oonorete 
since it 0 too, mirrors the whole of Absolute Mind or Reality. 
When anything is thought merely in the form ot *be1ng-
in-1tselt• ( or as not ·self-contradictory, 1t is called 
potential possible). Everything 1n so re:r aa it is 
determined as a Being•in-1tselt which is only a posi-
ted, is called merelt potential.. Such a Possibility, 
isolated fitom tfie Ac ualit7., haa an individual <X>ntent. T!~ potent~a:J. ~.$ som~-.mat as a totality or ita 
in•it8$ •existent determinations. Whatev~r posa&saea 
this internal perteot potentiality is not merely a 
posited-Being, but 1n-and-ror itself and immediately 
actual. The potentiality ot aubstan.oe 1s0 there.tore~ 
!ta actuality.;, 
· 4Ibid. 11 pp.. Jt8 tt. See alsQ IDt&u ~lect.io~, edited by J.~wenbe~g Hew -y:ork: Cbarlei"""'Scr1 eris Sona, 1929), 
pp. 20 t~ 
.$Ibid.• P• 115. -
4 
More concrete is Objective. Mind because it is more 
conseious of the order of relation with other m.1nda. Finite 
mind, as an individual and actual tact. is dependent upon 
and determine~ to some extent every othe~ fact. As the 
t'inite fa.at beaame-s aware of 1 ta relationship w1th each 
. 6 and every other taot or mind~ Objective Mind 1s reached. 
We oan see from this organic theo:ey 01' truth and reality 
that everything is internally determined by its relationsb 
positively and negativelya to everything else~ sincei negation 
aa well as its opposite is a form of ~elatiou. Objective 
Mind is ·a partial realization ot this relationship of the 
·whole to its parts0 of Real.ity to realities. Thus Hegel 
pictures this 11ealization of the relationships of finite 
i11S.nda ~ 
o o • The ooncrete ~etu.rn of me into me in the ex-
ternality is that I, tho 1nt:1nite self0 relat1on, am 
as a pe:rson the Pepulsion of me from myself~ and have 
'the existen~e of my personality in the being or 
other persons, in my relation to them and 1n my 
recognition of themg which is thus mutuai.7 
So we see also that a groater degree of oon:oreteneaa results 
t.'rom a greater realization of .finite relationship&. This 
proeesa continues until the .finite mind becomes aware of 
the camp.lete interdependence o:t all things or ideas finite 
with each other. It 1a then that Abso~ute Mind or Reality 
1s reached~ the culm~nation of ooncretoness, the zenith or 
6wright• .22.• ~·, PP• 319 and 324. 
?Hegel:, 3?• cit .• ,, p. 232. 
5 
Reality., But it is only reached through the nature ot 
Mind which 1s that the individual knows hie individuality 
to be rree, an absolutely treo will. Only through this 
na:tu.re ot free~om can the .finite mind even begin to realize 
the interirela.tionshipa · or each and every other :mind and thus 
a 
arrive at the concreteness of Absolute Mind. 
The Idea or Absolute Mind may also be ciuled Reason 
and is concisely described by Benjamin Randa 
The Idea may be described 1n many ways. ·1t may be 
called reason ( and this is the proper philosophical 
signif'ication of reason); subject-object; the 1m1ty 
of the ideal and real, of the finite and the inf'1n1te, 
of soul end bodyJ the possibility which has its 
actuali'i'.;y ln its own self J that of which the nature 
oan be thought only as existent, • o o n9 . 
As we have mentioned, ·an attribute of the Idea is 
also that it ia completely ratio~al. In point of fact, 
t he Idea as ultir-'10.te Reality is the most knowable thing 
ainoe every idea and finite mind reflects that Peal.1ty and 
gives to it the element c£ concreteness. As Russell observes, 
"Hegel asserts that the reo.l is rational, and the rational 
10 
is real." Hegel defined the Absolute Idea as "Der Begritt 
der Idee, dem die !dee ala solche der Gegenstand, dem daa 
o~jekt sie 1st.n11 Or petter, as Russell atatea, "The 
~bsolute Idea is pure thought thinking about pure thought."
12 
~egel, ~· .2!!•» PP• 221 t. 
9Modern Classical Philoso,hera, compiled oy ~enjamµi ijand 
(Can1br1dge, Masso: Houghton Ml tlln Oo., 1908), p. 611. 
10aertrand Russel, A Hist~rf o:r ~iester11 Philoaoph·l 
(New York: Simon and ScE.'uster, 9ij:$), P• 731. 
ll~o, Po 7)5. 12Ib1d., P• 135. 
6 
This .. of oourse, gives to the highest .form o.t' reality the 
gre.atest amount of perspicuit.y • pl'oviding that through a 
realization of individual tre0dom finite minds can arrive 
at the point where the· negative and positive relationships 
of all ideas, inaludints the "I" and "non-I" can be seen. 
· Before proceeding to the method by whioh this process 
0£ realization of relationship operates,. it is necessary 
to rnention in some detall one other oharaoteristic of the 
Absolute, since especial_l-y this was of much concern and 
evoked much criticism from Kierkegaard. Hegel equated the 
Idea with Truth. When the process of .finite mi.nd-s realizing 
th~ir interrelationships is at work; it is called objecti-
vity . This objectivity ~n corre.spondence with the notion 
may then be called Truth.-. According to Hegeli, 
Th~ Idea is TruthJ for Truth is the correspondence 
of objectivity with the notion:- not of course the 
correspondence 0£ external things with my c~ncep• 
tions.; ... for the~e ar.e only correct conoep-ticms held 
by me~ the individual person.13 
Hegel views the Absolute Reality as being Truth in ita 
highest torm. the result of the .free relationship and syn-
thesis of finite minds and ideas. 
In my view -- a view which the developed exposition 
of the system itsel.f' can alone justify -· everything 
depends on grasping and expressing the Ufi1mate truth 
not as Substanee but as Subject as well. 4 
Hegel envisioned the Absolute as an evolving body of truth 
l3Benjam1n Rand, .22.• cit., p. 160. 
14:segol, 21?.• ill•, p. 14.. 
7 
which was 1n its parts already mirrored 1n toto, but only --
after its final evolution did it have the ultiln.ate charac-
torlstic of t~uth. This evolution or truth takes place 
thtaough the pJ:>ocess of reflection and leads this self• 
doveJ.opntent ·to the end result 0 namely Truth. 
The truth ia the whole •••• Of the Absolute 
it must be said that it is essentially a J:>esult, 
that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; 
and just in that consists its nature, which is to 
be actual 0 subjectt or self-becoming, self•develop-
:ment ••• 
It is ~eflection uhioh constitutes ·truth the 
.final result • .5 
This Absolute T1•uth iG the result of reflection0 but 
not merely fil'lite 8 personal, or intimate reflection. It 
is not the result of a particular thought-process, or an 
individual mental discovery. Rather, it ia the result ot 
the synthesis of subjective realization, the awareness of 
self, and the awareness of the Pelationships of self' to its 
owa negation and other selfs. 
The knowing of Reason is therefore not the mere 
subjective certitude, but also TRUTH, because 
Truth consists in the harmony. or rather. unity of l6 
certitude and Being, or of certitude and objectivity. 
It is plain that ttwough a gradually increasing know-
ledge of one's relationship with others, and of the ideas 
with each other, through this process of growing objectivity 
on the part of the individual, Truth. the Absolute Reality 
is the result. This result is a synthesis of its affirmation 
and its negation. It ia. a completed whole 0 in harmon,- with 
l5Ib1d., PP• 16 r. -
a 
itself. Regel avers, 
But this result arrived at is itself simple innaediacyJ 
for it is self-connc1ous freedOI11, which is at one 
with itself', and has not set aside the opposition it 
involves and left it there, but has made1its account with it and has become reconciled to it. 1 
CHAPTER II 
THE DIALECTIC OF OBJECTIVITY 
The principle on which Hegel constructs the nature 
of the Abs-olute evidently is that in !ts own complete and 
fully realized condition it is totaJ.ly harmonious and not 
aelt-oontradiotoryo If it were contradictory to 1tsel.tg o~ 
if the Absolute could be further related to other negations. 
it would not be fully realized and could not then be formally 
and completely TRUTH. The very essence of the Absolute 
is una1:11mity and total realization. The reault of Subjective 
and Objective mind is Absolute mind. Russell observes, 
"It in thought by Hegel that the nature of Reality can be 
deduced from the sole consideration that it must be not 
self•eontradiotory."1 ihe p~ocess by which Truth is 
realized must proceed from the p~em1ae that Truth in itself 
and by itself is harmonious. This harmonr can be seen 
,t:;hrough the modus operandi. which 1s called dialeot!c. Apart 
trOill the former consideration we must keep 1n mind th.at 
to Hegel the Truth can only be realized through a ra~ional 
system since its nature is rational. He states, n • •• 
knowl·.edge '-s only real and can ·only be aet forth fully in 
lBertrand Bussell., A Histo~ ot Western Philosophy 
(New York: Simon and Schuater.4ST• P• /JI. 
9 
10 
the form of science, in the form or 07stem • • n2 • 
The dialectic begins wlth subjective mind. The 
exist0nca of finite mind is intrinsic, passive indifference. 
The nature of finite mind is naive immediate sense-con-
scioueneas and subjective ce:r·tainty. The awareness of its 
o,.m existence is almost all that an individual has to begin 
his long development through the dialectic. But there is 
something more intrinsically to be found 1n subjectivity 
besides sense-oonso1ousness. There is the desire to ex-
tei•nalize and 1 .. ealize itselt. It is more" in fact, than 
a deei1~e. It is an impulse., a demand er11anating from the 
vei'"J essence of subject itself. Hegel terms it a spiritual 
substance or· Welt6e1a~.3 Any given moment of an individual's 
existence must ~ind external expression and become objective. 
I ~ must leave its own aense-oonsoiousness and retuz-n again 
to be at one with i~csel.f. This des1l"e or impulse, which 
is in fact the efteot of the presence or !!e;tgeist 1n the 
world, is the cause and motivating principle of increasing 
objeotivity. It 1s the volition of the Absolute itaelt 
in its evolution through history. 
Having a motive fo:r the evolutionary process, it 1a 
possible to discern the meaning of "dialectic". In essence 
2He~el Selection!, edited by J. Loewenberg (Nev York: 
Charlescribner•s sons, 1929), p. 19. See also Modern 
Classical Ph1loa4!:hera, compiled Benjamin Rand (Cambridge, 
ffass.: Houghton M ttl!n co., 1908), P• S73. 
3Ib1d.~ pp. 23 tf. 
ll 
1t is the onQgoing work or the Absolute realizing itselr. 
It is through this process. self•w1Ued, by which Ti"Uth 
becomes concrete and aotual. As Swenson has observed, 
dialectic 
• o • is no mere subjective process, but the rorm 
taken by the self.•evolution of the Idea as a logical 
system~ and ie ip~~ faoto embodied as the w~rk of the 
~bjeotive reason -:i.n the historical process.~ 
The Absolute in realizing itself' through history 
performs the function of dialectic. It realizes 1ts~lf 
according to a logical pattern of increasing real.ity. We 
must., howcvez>s, distinguish between the total dialectical 
p~ocess and reflection. Reflection takes plaoe o~tside the 
predicate of a given thine;e Henceg reflection gives to 
t hat t hing a sphere oi: re.ferenoe,. relates it to similar 
phenomena, and yet leaves the thing val.id in its own right. 
On the other hand, dialeotic is the tendency within a thing 
which drives outside itself and in the process recognizes 
the l1mita.t1ons of those predicates. There!Cl>re, dialectic 
aunnuons the negation of its predicates, and eventually 
i! 
provides their synthesis.~ Hocking describes the process 
smmnarily when he points out that finite mind must 1n some 
way abrogate itself, in order to reali~e or appreciate 
itself, "wander in a world alien to its natuz-ett, and finally 
4oavid F. Swenson, Someth!ng About K1e~kefaard 
(Minneapolis: Auguaburg Pu61!ahlng ffouae, 1945, p. 118. 
Sitand, ER.• .fil•, p. S8o. 
l ,;, .... 
Dlalecf.; i.c is compoaod of tlu•0e sepru:•e.to hu~c ol oooly 
:rolati:nd phases. It 1s a dialeetio oi' t:i."iadt1 oach w.;.t.h its 
O '-J":1 thesiFJ 0 antit hes:ls,, and ~yntheais . Wright oxplalns, 
:tn 'l';ne .. Gh0sis a c01-'ta.1.n s.epec·t of· z~oality is 
!?eveo.led» in the e.ntltll.eais a c~nt:.:•a!Jting nspeot 
o.p ~:>0ru:>s jl and the b;o are t hen au:r!3eho'ben in a llig,~er 
aynthe3iS • :thi!l synthes:ls gi"il'0S :"> rse ~O q nEl"u? ·tz~ia<lg 
and that to ru.othm? in tur~'l. • • ., Every membei.. of 
evory t 1-oiud is the Absolu"~e.
7
• " • The order of' t he 
rl:i.al ectio is purelt logical. 
11.'his "t1.,iadic cor1s·i;ruation can bo e:q1lained w:1:i;h rei'erence 
i'i 1) the ei ta.t:l.on s:bovo 
8 
oonca~~n!l'lg r'1ense-consciousnese. 
!" · oo~uizes the r,,m;1ent ot' exist Gnce i12 the preclicate which 
B t such impl ieatim.1.s o1.' space or t1rn.e cha1.1g0 since moment.s 
in t:ui-ie nre in mot ion and one plaoe ~ay in p~actioe be 
ncny pl aces of smallarJ si~0. '1"11.erefore 0 ill! ril.mnent is o.t 
onoe ~ moment. A ri1001ont in tin1e is its own n egationJ, ao 
WEill ~s ito asser•tton. Yet tho "now" can be identified as 
ru1 "ab i ding now11 ore.a a.· "-gene~al now". Sense-consei ousness 
iD slso sencmoue. It has tha capeoity for perception. But 
ttu>ough perception it ca.~ only dete~ne a given sensation. 
-------
6w1111am. Ernest Hoclti:ng, ~ o!.' Phi,io.s ophy (Chict~~o : 
Cha~les Scrihner•s Sons, l939)o p . 3II'. 
7w11lia:i1 Kelley Wright, A :liL\ltory 0£ Modern P?liloso;eni, 
mcu York : Thu M&omilla.i., Oo., 1"94!) $ P:Po j27 i' • 
Bsup~~" p .. 10. 
13 
Since sonsat:ton ia tho propei•ty of: &.!. oxiatent; tJling in 
a given n1oroont1i and both tho thing and the aonent change, 
:931,,ception mu.a·t be geneval. Percopt:lon 1s " • • ,. a 
ming'.L:tng of. senrsuous deri';el'9.m:J.no.ti ona t.r1'i.~h those of Re.flGotion. 119 
S:tace the pr o:;;,ert:lea of perception belong to a eh e.:.."lgii1g 
t hi!1g.., they are tl'l.emselven changing and a!'e accidents. 
Conseiousr1esa in gene i:"t.~ thei"lg is tu.so understanding, a 
EY).1.th eaia of: the a biding present ( t hea,is ) and accldent 
(a.ntithesls ) .. 
This co11sciou~neata 5.tl general is a thesiac But t h ia 
has ·wi·c;hin itself :tts own negation o~ ant1:thesis. T'nis 
~.ntithesJ.a is a oonaciou.enass of something o·cher than 
perceptl(?n of seJ.r o Iri seTrl.ae•consciousneas one perceives 
,:me ~ u :se.Lf:.'. 'i}he object or that conseiotum0ss i s self. But 
t h l:) ant:'i:i.iheaia 'to that i s the knoi.;rledge of' others. Hegel 
deel [?..1•ee t;ht=d; :lt is d.0s:i.re1 which synthes izes t he object of 
10 
!:!onsciousne:Js ( seJ.f'} and t he r eeling of o~he?n1ess. This 
syntueaio ia self•coneciousness arld co~reaponds to objeeti-
vity. There.f'o:t-e, i:d.nc! beeoY-li.es objective when it ls ;r • 0 • 
in tho process of beoom:J.ng other to it~eli' • • o and 
ll 
in tra.nsoe11ding this other-nesa.n The obarac'toristie o~ 
objeetive mind ls 1_0 longer oonseiouaness in itself• but £or 
:7.toelf'. .Absolute r,1.ind i s s.a..li.iev~d by anothe).') union of 
·--------
0 
r.Hegel~ 2.E.• ~.g p. 71. 
lOibig.!., pp. 73 f . 
J.l~ • . , p • .31 .• 
subje,Jtive and obJedt:tve n1ind. Absolute ntlnd ia conscious-
' 
110sa in and f ol.>l :1. tse~f. This synthesis of oonsoiou:mess in 
Absolute or Rea.s on. Hegel a.tatea1. 0 It { Rease~} is just as 
wall the ee1 .. ·~itude of' itself ( subjectivity) as boing ( or 
objaoti·u-1-t;y) ~ and ·i;his.P too,, in one ar.id the same thinkin~ 
, . . ~l2 
re.ct: .. 'il:l -&yo" 
Seen as a con1ple·te process, t l'&~ dialeot1c ot' Ros.sou 
ia a -chree:Cold movement in N"hioh thei>e is a necess~· 
sequ.enoe of log ical. orr.lcz•s FI'cm a given fact ti1e entithesis 
t;o ·t h at f'ac'i; :n1ust neee,saarily be dz:>a.w.n since t~hG fact con-
tains in its essence that an.tithesis. The i'a.ct is subjec ... 
t 1ve.. The syn'theais becomes another fact to which there 
i s anti'i:;hesis. Th9 reconciliation of' -those two is a syn-
·thosis of objeo·blvity. That objeotivityg because of its 
t ion between the subjeet and the object ia lost in the 
13 
pz,ooesa oi' objecrtivi·cy b- Absolute mind 01~ Reason is reached. 
The Absolute !des. is reached by this dialectical process 
·\'.f.aich finds its necessi ty il't the pervading a11d all-embracing 
Idea. Thia dialectic must proceed from thoais to anti-
thesis to syni;hesis beoa:use ·i;h:l.a is the nature of: the Idea 
~ i t I'ealizes itself. 
From the fo1•egoing evidence it is clear that Truth is 
the synthesis of ·temporary opposites. It is achieved by 
...... 
12Ibid., P• 78. 
l.Jaussell, ~· ill.•, P• 73!1 .• 
l~ 
a :method which has necessary log1o·al categories within 1t 
whi ch a i."e irl;;posed by the natUI"e of the Idea. itself'. The 
14 method is speculative and rational, and is aohie11«)d by 
the u f}e of: reflection and the logical categories or dialec-
t:l.e a The dialectic of objectivity inheres in the nature 
of the Absolu.t e and finite !ilS.nd. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EXISTENTIAL CRITIQUE 
The ex:istantial ph1losoph)· of Siren Kierkegaard presen-
ted a destructive cri tiqua to ·the salient feature.a ot 
Regellan absolute idealism. Our inquiry ia confined to 
those fea·twes which were the object of apeoial criticisme 
The thoi~tic existentialism which contended with the 
nature and method of idealism rebelled against Hegel's 
con.espt of reality. Reality was for Kierkegaard t~ more 
t han knowledge about h:1.stoey or about the method i.."l- wh1oh 
1 i; evolved an the realization of the life of the Absolute. 
Reality is not the unified whole which realized itselt 
by logical, bloodless categories. Reality is rather exist-
ence, and that wh1oh exists. Kierkegaal'd attacked logic• 
thereforei> m1 absti,aot scienoe outside the realm of 
existence, as a cbaraoteristic of Reality. He insisted 
that concreteness is on1y concrete in existential reference 
and cannot be attained by reasone He objected that reality 
does not by its own n~ture necessarily reveal it-sell". 
Whereas Hegel had maintained that finite minds increased 
their concrete actuality by their awareness of rel.at1onsh1p 
to other minds, Kierkegaard objected that this knowledge 
or awareness of self in relation to others was merely a 
thought process 1n, the abstract whieh did not by its own 
16 
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method include existence. but annihilated it. Swenson 
observes that the thought ot an existential thinker is a 
concrete thought 
••• in that it has essential reference to the 
thinker •••• Abstract thought. on the other hand, 
prooeeds by way ot' abstracting from the thinker a..."1.d 
from all concrete particularity; it oontentf itself 
with seeking to eJ<pl-ain reality in general. 
Against the conception of Iieg.el that the return or the 
individual into himself by means of the thought process con-
stituted increasing reality, Kierkegaard sought to demon-
atra:ce how impossibla auch an abstract process waa in pro-
ducing a measure of concrerteness. The system which suppo-
sedly increases concreteness is by its own nature beyond 
t he sphere of existence and therefore oarmot take existence 
into account. If this be the case, the results of such a 
process would be quite unreal and non-existontJ anything 
but concrete. Kierkegaard formulates the objection: 
Reality itaelf is a system -- for GodJ but it cannot 
be a system for any: existing spirit. System and 
finality correspond to one another, but existence 
is precisely the opposite of finality. It may be -
seen, from a purely abstract point of view- that 
system and existence are incapable of b&ing thought 
togetherJ because in order to think existence at all, 
systematic thought mus~ think it as abrogated. and 
hence as not existing. 
The basic problem here is one of logic. For Hegel 
it is th.rough the process of logical. relationship that 
lnav1d F. Swenson, Something About Kierkega-ard 
(Minneapolisz Augsburg PubIIahlng House. 1945), pp. 112 r. 
2spren Kierkegaard, Oonplud~ Unao1ent1tic Postacr1pt, 
translated by David F. Swenson an Waiter Lowrie (Piiliiceton, 
Nev Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 102. 
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oonore·l.e reality and ultimate truth are achieved. But 
Kierkegaard contends that logic does not 1n itself reveal 
existence. A logical system can.not include existence. 
Existence is never a predicated thing. Therefore abstract 
thought igno1~es~ in faot,. the temporal, existential process. 
J?inite mind to become real and concrete in the fullest 
ae1 ae must, according to Hegel, paaa through Buccessive 
phases of' self-realization, and this by the process of 
speculation. Kierkegaard points out that this finite mind 
is existing. It is a definite something0 and therefore 
existence is the basis if.aioh is le.i't and forgotten once 
abstract thought begins to speculate in a f'ut1le etf'ort to 
:i.ncrease the reality or that f1n1tude. He declares. 
This definite something is just what abstract thought 
abstracts trom. But the difficulty lies in bringing 
this definite sometrdng and the ideality of thought 
together, by- penetrating the concrete particularity 
with thought. Abstract thought cannot even take 
cognizance of this contradiction, since the very 
process of abatraction prevents the contradiction 
from a.rising. J 
It is simply by default that the logic which Hegel. employs 
fails to give any degree or concreteness to reality. By 
!'ailing to define the relation ot logic to the existing 
individual, existence is con.fused. Hegel maintained that 
the individual became concrete through the thinking or a 
subjective mind about its existence. This is precisely 
where the error lies, for to think existence 1n the abstract 
3Ib1d., p. 267. -
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terms of reason is the aame aa abrogating it. Therefore, 
1•eality o-annot be thought about. Kierkegaard explains, 
"Abstract thought can get hold of reality only by nullifying 
1t0 ~"lei. this nullitioation of reality consists in trans-
forming it into poss1bility.n4 This being the case, to · 
.f.'olJ.ow the laws or a logioal s.ystem tor the discovery of 
reality would be to make life 'Q.lll'eal because logic can onl7 
be a statement !£OU'fL 11.t'e ~d not living itself. As a 
resiu.t of sueh a condition it would be foolish to add to 
t he amount of lmowledge abaut lire because no amount could 
r,1ake reality living or oonarete. It waa for this ve1!y 
r•ee.aon that Spr·en. Kierkegaard proposed to abandon the 
abr3t:raot dialectic of Hegel and in its place describe the 
almost synonomous collr.'.ect,.on ot real.ity tQ i,;~sonality • and 
' et, ... •" 
to existential thinking. 
The logical oategor1ea which Hegel constructed were 
the implicit function, of the Worldspirit that made reality 
rational. It was for that reason that he could say that 
t he real was rational imd the rational, real. To the 
oontral"1, Kierkegaard could visualize no purely rational 
system. 'Which could resolve the tensions and eontrad1ctiona 
which in £act exist 1n lii'e as a part or reality. Hegel 
held that reality, ultimate truth; was the final synthesia 
or subjective certitude and objectivity. Kierkegaard 
asserted that through this objectivity the individual paaaed 
out of. reality or the sphere ot existence, and therefore 
41bid., p. 279. -
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could not explain existence from an unrealistic position. 
He objected to Hegel's attempt 1n this way to introduce 
movement into logic. Abstract thought cannot have within 
itself a11y motion since 1n abstracting from the existence 
of time, the moments or time are lost and the progression 
from one moment to another 1s only an illusion. A syn-
thesis of two contradictory propositions is movement because 
·there 1s a transition from possibility within the oontra-
dictions to the actuality 1n the .synthesis. In abstract 
thought, however, time and space, which presuppose movement, 
are not implicit, and therefore neither is movement. 
Kierkegaard states,". o • abstract eternity 1a extraneous 
to the movement of life ••• pure thought either abrogates 
motion altogether, or meaninglessly imports it into logic."5 
It is clear from this principle that a rational synthesis 
of contradictions is hilpossible existentially. Moreover, 
abstract thought pr~yents such a synthesis of certitude 
and being or objectivity • 
• • • existene~ ituelf •• • keeps the moments of 
thought and being apart •••• For an objective 
reflection the ti-uth becomes an object, something 
objective, and thought must be point ~d away f'rom 
the subject. 
The way of' objective ref'lect1on leads to abstract 
thought, to ,mathemat1cs, to historical lmowledge of 
dif'ferent kinds; and always it leads away from the 
subject, who~e existence ••• become~ in.t'1n1tely 
indifferent. 
5 ~-, p. 211. 
6!!?!!. » PP· 171 tr. 
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The result or such an abstract rational process is 
total unreality 1n a sphere beyond existence.· Therefore, 
a logical system, or better0 a rational system preaents no 
more to the existing individual than a number of poas1b1l1t1es 
. 7 
which are no existential qualities. Reality, however, 
exists between thought and being. Knowledge about reality 
results solely in possibility. 
Reality is an inter-ease between the moments ot 
that hypothetical un!ty of thought and being which 
abstract thought presupposes ••• 
All knowledge about reality is poss1blity. 
The only reality to which an exiat1.ng individual may 
have a relation that 1B more than cognitive, is 
his own reality ••• 
A further result oi' Hegel's view of the nature ot 
r ea.li ty 01: truth is that it excludes the content of ethics 
in Kierkegaard's estimation. This is the approach that 
he used in or1t1c!z1ng the Idea as T:ruth. H.ageliaii Truth 
excludes ethics for the :reason that contradictions which 
exist are reconciled in the abstract which is abova and 
beyond existence, and therefore above reality. If in the 
realm of reality there are no true opposing and irrecon-
cilable propositions. there can be no choice~ no w1ll to 
choose, and ethical action ia then denied to the individual. 
Such a denial of choice is the annihilation ot individuality 
and existence 1 taelt. When true and existing a:> ntrad1ct1ona 
a.re superficially reeolved,. Tz-uth becomes a figment of the 
7Ib1d •• p. 285. 
8Ib1d., pp. 279 f. 
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imagination and no more. Swenson says, 
••• Suoh ' oontemplat1on abstracts from the process 
of becoming as it ia in real time, merely viewing the 
event as given 1n the abstract form or time. It 
therefore neglects, as immanent contemplation, the 
unrealized poss1b111t1es which were present in the 
real process of coming-to-be, and which constituted 
alternatives for the wills o:f the participants."" 
Kierkegaard maintained that a reconciliation of oontra-
dietions · was impossible. Taking existence into account, 
it does the very opposit1e of synthesizing thought and 
object ivi ty into reality. It holds them apsrt. The union 
of subject and objeot, of eternity and time, of sin· and 
righteousness~ is thwarted by the ~act of their separate 
exi stence and their opposing forces. These are unalterably 
opposed, with but one exception 1n the person of Jesus 
Christ~ the God-man, in Whom time and eternity met.10 
Hegel, in attempting to resolve contradictions, had to 
i ncorporate movement, the transitional action, into thought. 
This incorporation of movement was illuaory, but because 
it was there, Hegel could see no permanent diajuncture 
between antithetical propositions. Kierkegaard unmasked 
this illusion and preserved the existence of permanent 
contradictions. These contradictions could only be resolved 
in the sphere ot logical, bloodless categories. With the 
permanent exiatenoe or contradiction. ethics are mandatory. 
9swenson, .2£• ~., pp. 120 t. 
lOiJugh Roes Mackintosh, ~e~ ot Modern Theology (Great 
Br1taina Oharlea Scrlbner1 a !oiii; n.39), P• Zij.3. 
j ' 23 
I 
He avers that when th~ attempt is made to bring thought 
,I 
1ntG relation with another thing 
• e • interest begins to play a role 1n the matter. 
The ins'l~ant this happens the ethical is present ••• 
It forbids me to draw a conclusion that is ethically 
deceiti"Ul and metaphysically· ~olear0 by 1mpos1ng 
upon me the duty of existing. 
Hegel asserted t hat thought thinking about itself 
was reality. Kierkegaard points out ·that 1!' this were so, 
t he per fect or neariy perfect anticipation of an action 
would be the action, but in !'aot no aetion would have taken 
place and the et h ic al consideration would disappear. If 
existence is treatedt abstract thought cannot prod.ice real 
action. Existence alone can do that, and thus the ethical 
action is preserved. We can aay then that 1~eality 1a 
et h ical reality and the only reality for the 1nd1viduaJ.. 
This existentialistic view does not result 1n a series or 
posaibilities forever unrealized. No possibility is 
understood or realized ·until it ia first an actuality. The 
ethical principle involved" • • • results 1n the condem• 
nation of every poase which is not an!.!!!. ••• 1n the 
12 individual himself." The ethical principle must be 
understood .for an appreciation of the existentialist 
critique of ideal.istic truth. Hegel viewed truth as the 
correspondence ot obj-ectivity with the notion. But this 
!s exactly untruth to the existentialist, for in the area 
llK1erkegaard, .21?~. ~it., pp. 282 t. 
12 Ibid., p. 288. 
where truth can be viewed objeot1vely there 1a no realit7. 
no existence. Therefore, the truth which can be seen oan 
have no existence. It 1a therefore untruth. Truth can 
only be found where there is ethical choice and existence. 
Exietenee cannot be reasoned, for in being so it is abroated. 
E.xlstence oan only be found 1n one's self', in an individual's 
subjectivity. Here al.one 1a where t~uth lies. In the 
subjectivity and inwardness of the individual, tho person 
meets the oold contradiotiona of ex1stence11 for example, 
ain and righteousness. He has an ethioal. choice. He can 
. 
only meet that choice in the immediacy of the moment. He 
can only make that choice through movement. That movement 
is not inherent in the alternatives presented to him. It 
1s no'b necessitated by the nature of the <X> ntradiotions 
themselves or by the pPesence or some Worldspirit in 
operation. It is nooessitated by an act or will arising 
out of despair which is born 1n the inwardness of the 
individual. Therefore Kierkegaard can define truth 1n 
opposition to Hegel as ".!B. objective uncertainty~ 
£!!.i !,!! !!! aERropriation-proceas 2£ ~~passionate 
inwardness. o • the highest truth obtainable for an 
l) 
existing individual." 
According to Hegel, the presence ot the Absolute is 
implicit in finite mind. It 1a the nature of both to realize 
themselves. This is the very nature ot self-realization. 
Of necessity it muat realize itaelt. Thia 1a the principle of 
l3Ib1d., p. 182. -
idealistic eth1cs. Hocking observes, "Our highest ethical 
law is» Identitz thyself~ objective Reason• as round 
in the institutions of mankind.nl4 In contrast to this - ....,._ -.. -------
necessity of self•re~lization Kierkegaard described the 
motive for the movement of the individual 1n tezwms of 
despaix•., Despair was not the nature of permanent antitheses~ 
but 1n the aubjectivity of the individual as he taoed these 
ant; itheses despair was oreated. An overwhelming sense of 
sin and guilt was born. 
The inwardness that is the core of the ethical 
and eth1co-religioua 1nd1v1dual understands suffering 
on the other hand as something essential • •• the 
religious individual has suffering a, nstantly with 
him. He require~ .sutrerins ••• and he requires 
and has au.r1~r1ng even 1n the absence of external :iui sf'ortune. !'> 
Thi a suffering is essential because it is the product of 
inwardness in which one confronts the endless antitheses 
of existence. As he confronts them he has an ethical choice. 
The choosing is an act of decision and it is this decision 
16 
which is truth for the existing individual. This decision 
is prompted by the despairing of one's aelf aa he cont'ronta 
the contradictions, by his own inner oons.ciousness of sin 
17 and guilt. This being the motive tor an act of volition, 
the individual makes a decision, and this is movement, a 
l.4iioek1ng, ~· ill•• P• 357 • 
l5K1erkegaard • .21!• ~., p. 389. 
l6rb1d., p. 306. -
17Mack1ntoah, .22• ~ •• pp. 236 rr. 
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leap ~which breaks entirely through the circle of self 
and sets the agent fully on the side of an Other person • • 
Thus the goal of existential movement is not self-realiza-
tion but quite the ~ppos1te, namely, decision to leap beyond 
the confines of one's own inner nature into beliet, and to 




This evokes the ethical problem present in the contrast 
of idealism and theistic exiatent1al1m. The highest ethical 
law was for Hegel the finite identity with the absolute. It 
the microoosm were the mirror of the macrocosm there was, 
for Kierkegaard, no room left for ethical action because 
t he individual was a law unto himself 4, Yet 1n the sense 
of idealistic ethics the individual's greatest concern waa 
f or an identity -with the absolute; f'!guratively ealled Godo 
20 This was regarded by Kierkegaard as the grossest idolat17. 
Thia ia what happened. In the depths of subjectivity the 
finite mind sought relentlessly to abrogate itselr and tind 
in itself its negation, the total otherness of the absolute. 
But at the same time this finite mind was complete 1n its 
own right, a mirror of the absolute. Thus in the union of 
subject and object, the goal of the subject was itaelt. The 
object of its worship was within itself• and so its worship 
18Paul Ramsey, wExiatenz and the Existence of God," 
!!!!, Jotll'nal _2! Religion (July, 1948), Po 171. 
19Kierkegaard, .2.E.~ !!!:.•, P• 277. 
20~., pp. 178 rr. 
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was proj eoted beyond 1 teel!' only to return and find within. 
itself its object. Thia. as has been poignantly described 
21 
by Ramsey, corresponds to the Old Testament concept or 
idolatry set forth 1n Isaiah 44, 14•17. The reault of auah 
a self-realization ethics :ts to f1nd in the self the prime 
interest, and through the self to 1'1nd the good or the masses. 
By this ~ethod God was manifest in the ethical conduct of 
men. Kierkegaard stressed the absolute paradox existing 
botw·een God and man, excepting the person of Jesus Christ as 
has been not·od above. God does not reveal himsell' in the 
ethical actions of man. Rather, man, through his subjective 
inwardness, a:> nfronts an ethical ohoice, an unresolved para ... 
dox» and in the act of decision he ~es a leap of faith into 
something totally othez, than himself. Man•s role then is 
not the absolute realizing 1 tself', but obedience to som thing 
other than himself. God 1s that Other Who is not revealed 
qua God in man's action. Says the melancholy Dane,"• •• 
no one is so resigned as GodJ for lie communicates in creating• 
so as by creating to giv~ independence over against H1mselt.n22 
It in an idealistic ethic God is communicated to man 
by manf> God oan be known simply by observation and the 
objective processes of reason. Therefoi-e; He can be the 
subject of an interchange of thoughts in the toll'Dl of logical 
expression -- language. He can be communicated to other 
minds at any time. In the. existentialiatio view God 
21 1 l /. 7 Loe.ct •• p~ o. --
22K1erkegaard, ~· .!:!i•• p. 232. 
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can11ot be so communicated bec$use God ex1ata and this 
condition cannot be predicated. That is to say, even 
I 
while these words convey the abatract thought that God 
! 
exists, in reality they annihilate His existence because these 
wo1 .. ds say only something about God and do not experience Him. 
God can only be oommunioated in existenoe, in experience, 
in the 1nnned1acy or the moment of decision by the individual 
himself. It follows f'rom this that reality or God cannot 
be t he subject of an exchange of ideas. No one beyond 
t he individual can experience reality through such a meana. 
I n t he words o:f Kierkegae.rdt 
The ethical lays hold ot eaoh individual and demands 
that he refrain .from all contemplation, especially 
of human! ty and tho world; .for the ethioala as b e1ng 
the internal, cannot be observed by an outsider. 
It can be realized only by the individual subject, 23 who alone 08.l.'l know what it is that moves within him. 
From this existential position objectivity cannot be the 
source or form of comr11tmication at all. It can do nothing 
but carcy the hearer into a similar :re.alm. oi' unreality. 
This position# of' course, presents a serious problem. 
If God cannot be communicated in this way, how oan He be? 
Kierkegaard -1ludes to this problem with the e;.;:ample of 
a teacher who teaches that be should have no d1oc1.pl~~. 
Yet when those whom he teaches have taught likewise, the 
teacher .finds himself in the embarrasing position of having 
done the ve7!'1 thing he set .out not to do.24 God can only be 
2.3Ib1d., P• 284. -24 Ibid., p. 70. -
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found 1n the leap of faith which is found 1n the inmost 
subjectivity. Thia is an act that can only be perpetrated 
in the isolation or total inwardness, If th1s 1s the case, 
then God cannot be tausht . He instead must do the teaching. 
To the p1"oblem then, of bow one can become a believer, 
Kierkegaard answers~ 
A believer is one who is infinitely interested 1n 
a:nother•a real.ity. This is a decisive criterion 
for faith, and the interest in question is not just 
a little curiosity., but an absolute dependence upon 
faithVs object. 
The object of faith is the reality of another, 
and the relationship is one of infinite interest •• 
'Fae object of reality is ••• God•s reality 1n 
existence as a part.icular individualg the fac~5that God has existed as an individual human being. 
• • 
The communication of existing reality or of God0 man can 
t herefore not be done by symbols. For this reason doctrines 
rail to communicate the life of God. They are the negation 
of life. The Church does not in its history or content 
co:mmunioate this life for both are mere abstractions of 
reality beyond the sphere or existence. God is communica-
ted only indirectly when the individual, in the depths 
of .fear and trembl1ng0 finds an in.finite interest in the 
rea11ty of God Who exists. 
We may ask here what possible purpose language can 
serve in this function it it tails to convey the religious 
message. Language, though it tails to impart any existential 
reality, functions aa indirect ooI11IBun1cation without which 
man could not poaaibly come to an existential knowledge or 
JO 
God in the first place. Throughout the Postscript 
Kierkogaard has made those liho vould "orate" Christianity . 
the butt of much venomous 1nveot1ve and parody. Only, 
h<Ywe ve~, .for the reason that these orators have convinced 
26 themselves that God can be directly communioated. A 
ahat-p line ot distinction must here be drawn between direct 
and i ndirect aormnun1oat1on. Neither the Church nor society 
could function without t he aid of language. God coul.d 
nevet> become a living reality for anyone with.out its use. 
Bu<!; the would•be orator who is wont to use it should take 
caref ul note that language sez-ves the pui .. pose of' indirect 
corrarr11nication only. Th!'ough th.is nethod God can be wit• 
nessed and praised and thereby introduced to the knowledge, 
however abstract it might be, of the unbeliev~r. From 
t his point on the individual must 1n obedience bow to the 
will ot God as He makes it known in the subjectivity ot the 
man. God and reality 819e not"• •• directly communicable 
••• and cannot be understood immediately, but must be 
understood indirectly tlu.•,;;ugh indirect signs.·n27 
This argument served to criticize the conclusion deri-
ved from the Hegelian synthesis that if the individual were 
a tteflection or the Absolute ( a necessary ooncl. ueion 1n 
Hegel ' s logi~)» rational exahange or thought between in• 
d1viduals which imparted increasing degrees of concrete 







' reality was not o~y possible but essential to tho 
I 
realization of the Absolute in history. Without the 
I 
element of existe~ce in communication, none was ample 
'· 
enough to carry on the a~areneas or God or reality. All 
it could do was indirectly• and very necessarily• oommuni• 
cate that reality so aa to enable the individual to 
app~opriate reality in hia inmost inwardness. Swenson 
summarizes" 
For a real understanding, as distinct from an 
illusory appearance of knowledge. there is here 
required a 'double reflection.• In the first stage 
of reflection, the thinker finds a univeraal 
principle J in the second stage, he discovers .a 
particular application of this principle to his 
own individual person and situation •••• Thia 
la.st reflection, which olears the road tor action, 
is not and cannot be a cooperative enterprise but 
is rather soxrething which ~ach individual haa 
for himself -- an essential secret. By this retlec-
t1on the individual isolates himselr, since 1t makes 
the truth 1nt~
8
sorneth1ng that belongs to him and 
to him alone. 
28swenson, ~· ~., P• 114. 
CONCLUSION 
The philosophic position or Kierkegaard was perhaps 
one or the moat basic attacks which could be leveled 
against a purely rationalistic idealism like Hegel's• 
His attack was pointed precisely at that point where 
ultimately all forms ot rationalism inust be weak, namely,, 
the failure of a pure~ abstract system to encounterg deal 
withg or comprise the element of being or existence. 
Though iuuch may be said in favor of a pseudo-system which 
atterapts to embrac~ this signifioant area, it lies within 
the scope ot this paper only to demonstrate the ettective-
11ess with which Kierkegaard used thia element of existence 
to attack the idealism ot Hegel. This has been done, 
we believeg in the evidence adduced. 
We have pointed to the salient .features ot Hegel's 
pantheistic and rationalistic idealism which were areaa 
of contention 1n the position ot Spren Kierkegaard. It 
may be observed from the evidence that his critique 
regarding concreteness in Hegel•s system, his attack upon 
the possibility of an existing rational system for the 
acquisition of tl'Uth• and his condemnation of the motive 
tor such a system, the ethics of such, and the possibility 
0£ the communication in the system, were all baaed upon the 
neoessa17 inclusion of extstenoe into any aearoh tor 
philosophic or re11g1oua truth. Thia 1a the reason to~ 
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calling Kierkegaard's position a theistic existential one. 
It ~as broad enough to include the oft overlooked dimension 
of' existence, and narzoow enough to regal'd the truth as 
an end in the long struggle of moral man w1 th moral and 
contradicting phenomena. For this reason, Kierkegaard waa 
a moi,,alist above all. He i,eplaced tunct'ions of mind with 
moral considerations, objective rationalization with 
subjective examination,. and 1n so doing provided us with 
one or the most erudite or1tic1ams ever adduced against 
Hegelian philosophy. 
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